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Abstract: Recently, advancements in energy distribution models have fulfilled the needs of
microgrids in finding a suitable energy distribution model between producer and consumer without
the need of central controlling authority. Most of the energy distribution model deals with energy
transactions and losses without considering the security aspects such as information tampering.
The transaction data could be accessible online to keep track of the energy distribution between the
consumer and producer (e.g., online payment records and supplier profiles). However this data
is prone to modification and misuse if a consumer moves from one producer to other. Blockchain
is considered to be one solution to allow users to exchange energy related data and keep track
of it without exposing it to modification. In this paper, electrical transactions embedded in
blockchain are validated using the signatures of multiple producers based on their assigned attributes.
These signatures are verified and endorsed by the consumers satisfying those attributes without
revealing any information. The public and private keys for these consumers are generated by the
producers and endorsement procedure using these keys ensures that these consumers are authorized.
This approach does not need any central authority. To resist against collision attacks, producers
are given a secret pseudorandom function seed. The comparative analysis shows the efficiency of
proposed approach over the existing ones.
Keywords: secure communication; microgrid; security
1. Introduction
Microgrids act as source of electricity to small geographical region such as healthcare centers,
military units, homes etc. [1–3]. Microgrids can also be integrated with national power distribution
centers and other renewable energy generation sources (e.g., solar, wind etc.). The basic architecture
of mircogrid includes (1) electrical load, (2) energy storage unit and (3) a line to and from the main
grid. The integration of microgrids with the main grid make them to operate in the connected mode
along with their standalone operation capabilities. Hence microgrids first fulfill with the local energy
requirements and then provide extra energy to the main grid to facilitate other consumers.
Various microgrid projects in USA use the blockchain technology for managing energy
transactions and give an overview about new energy system. New energy system concept is based on
distributed generation including renewable sources, energy transmission to consumers/main-grid,
communication among various distribution and communication network elements and managing
financial transactions. The main stakeholder also tries to reduce the time that spent on managing
financial transactions. Consumer might gets energy from multiple distributors and billing server
needs a reliable and authentic information. This is made possible by the use of blockchain that
offers cryptocurrency for monetary transactions in energy field. Many companies have set up energy
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exchange platforms to bring the buyers and sellers on one page. For example, dutch company
Vandebron [4] offers the possibility to buy energy directly from producers using a central entity that
manages the network, prepares bills and checks the balance between production and consumption.
In mircogrids, decentralized authorities make the transactions efficiently manageable using blockchain
but this approach is very resource consuming considering all the stakeholders in the authentication and
information processing. Also each stakeholder must have an access to desire transaction data instead
of whole consumers transactions. Each stakeholder must have to verify its authenticity before making
any changes to the consumer transactions. In authentication, multiple attribute-based signature is an
efficient approach that meets with the requirement of distributed authentication procedure and also
protects the consumers privacy [5].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A literature survey is provided in Section 2 while
an overview of blockchain and attribute-based encryption are discussed in Section 3. Section 4
provides a brief mathematical details of attribute-based algorithms. The proposed security algorithm is
discussed in Section 5. The performance evaluation of the proposed algorithm is presented in Section 6.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
Main Contribution
The main contributions of this paper are:
1. develop a framework to keep the record of energy transactions for future use and verification
purpose by new consumers
2. hide the actual transaction details while disclosing only the reputation and performance metrics
of a mircogrid owners
2. Literature Survey
Cyber security in smart grids is analyzed in detail in [6]; however, this section only considers
the relevant information of that analysis. Authentication in smart grids is one of the main critical
security aspect that allows the users to access the its various elements. It is achieved using the digital
signatures, username and password approach and hashing functions. In a digital signature, a user first
generates the hash of a message using Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA) or Message-Digest algorithm
(MD5) and then encrypts it with his private key using RSA. The encrypted hash can only be decrypted
with the public key of same user who encrypted it. This ensures the authenticity of the message while
the user authentication is achieved by the username and password approach.
Many other security approaches based on one time signature, message authentication code (MAC),
RSA encryption are proposed in [7,8]. In one signature approach, each signature is used once to very a
message. This helps to avoid the replay attacks as the message will be discarded if received after a
threshold time value. Precomputed hashing approach is proposed in [9], however it suffers from a
very large computational power to map the messages with the precomputed hashes.
In message authentication code, a single key is shared between the communicating parties to
verify and authenticate the received messages. TESLA [7] used the same concept with slight changes.
In TESLA, time is divided into slots and for each slot there is one secret key. A message for a particular
time slot is encrypted with a key belonging to that slot. The message is then send to the receiver while
the key belonging to the message is released after it expiry. Hence a receiver receives the messages,
buffered them and wait for the corresponding keys. However this approach has a very high memory
requirements as the receiver has to stored all the messages until it receives the keys. This approach is
not feasible for the real time applications.
Most of the existing security solutions are proposed for the smart grids communications that
are not suitable for the microgrids communications due to different architecture. A detailed security
analysis based on the microgrid architecture is presented in [10]. However, this analysis did not
address the communication security threats and solutions in mircogrid architecture.
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Sahai and Waters [11] presented attribute-based framework to build a number of cryptographic
primitives. The attribute-based signature scheme allows the user to attest the correctness of information
while hiding its original contents from outside world. The signature is only a validation procedure that
ensures the message is endorsed by the signer having valid attributes. An attribute-based signature
ensures privacy to signer while it ensures unforgeability to the verifier. Khader [12] presented a group
signature scheme based on attributes while the formal definition was presented in [5,13]. The security
of these protocols were analyzed in only generic group model. A secure forward attribute-based
signature schemes were presented in [14,15] however they did not consider the adaptive-predicate
privacy and unforgeability. A fully secured attribute-based signature scheme for standard model and
other models considering the non-monotone predicate is presented in [16]. However it is not suitable
to apply in practice. To improve the efficiency, Chen [17] presented attribute-based short signature
scheme but this scheme is based on single authority which does not fit in distributed applications.
To improve the computational cost, an efficient attribute-based signature scheme with monotone
predicate is presented by Gu [18]. To reduce the dependency on attribute authorities, escrow based
attribute-based signature scheme is presented by Cui [19] where users could provide evidence to the
verifier about their signature rights. However, these schemes are based on a single authority that is
not suitable for distributed systems. In this paper, we propose multiple authorities attribute-based
signature scheme for blockchain microgrid architecture that suits the distributed nature of system both
in security as well as tamper proof energy transaction record.
3. Background
This section gives a breif overview of blockchain technology and attribute-based authentication
mechanism. These two technologies in later sections are used to describe how user can benefit from
them in making a secure and reliable energy transactions in microgrid architecture.
3.1. Blockchain
Blockchain technology concept is based on distributed database that keeps the records of all
transactions in ordered list in which they are executed without the involvement of central authority
(e.g., banks). Bitcoin (also known as crypto currency) is one of the main example that uses blockchain
for all transactions without any central authority. Smart contracts are also established using blockchain
and execute automatically when they fulfill the required conditions. Hence bloachchain is a distributed
ledger that grows continuously with data/transaction record called block. Each individual block in the
blockchain is time-stamped, connected with previous block, shared and not modifiable. In this paper,
blockchain is used by the users to check and records all the transactions occurred in the network and
selects an appropriate microgrid distributor to purchase and deal in energy. A user can verify a copy
of blockchain or newly received block and add it into its chain. Once added into chain, block cannot
be modified. Any attempt to modify the block in chain results in invalid chain. Blochchain technology
has the following main elements:
1. verification mechanism
2. a network to share blocks (ledgers)
Including previous block hash into the new block connects them with each other and this enables
the user to check the validity of blockchain by only verifying the authenticity of last block in a chain.
The network allows each user to share the distributed ledger with other users. Figure 1 gives a pictorial
representation of blockchain where each block contains one or more transactions. For example, who is
purchasing and selling energy, amount of energy, duration and time-stamp. In this scenario, everyone
in the network knows everyone else transaction details and may reveal private information if not
secured. To attract the consumers, mircogrid owner also include his/her performance report as a block
in chain. This performance report must be verified and attested by the his/her previous consumers.
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In this paper, we are addressing the verification and attesting mechanism of such performance report
block in blockchain using attribute-based authentication mechanism.
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Fig. 1: Simplified conceptual scheme of an energy blockchain.
batches of individual transactions and eventually programs.
In our scenario the blockchain allows users keeping track of
all energy transactions that occur in the network. All users
maintain a copy of the blockchain and can verify their blocks.
Once transactions are included in blocks, they cannot be
modified anymore because any tampering is revealed by the
verification mechanism. The blockchain technology is enabled
by the following elements:
• a verification mechanism;
• a data network to share the ledger.
Users can check that all blocks have not been subjected to
tampering, quickly and efficiently, by checking only the last
block. A data network is needed to permit prosumers sharing
the distributed ledger. Fig. 1 shows the blockchain as a ledger
of blocks, where each block contains one or more transactions.
In case of energy purchase or selling, blocks can be organized
in tables containing details including source (generator), desti-
nation (load), transferred energy [kWh], timestamp, duration,
power profile [kW]. We propose to add in the blockchain also
presumed and/or measured losses due to non-linear effects and
reactive power flows.
Each block in the blockchain contains a header and a data
field. The header contains a string that uniquely identifies
the block and is obtained from the previous block using the
Secure Hash Algorithm SHA256 [5]. This is used to check
for validity. The SHA algorithms receives in input a variable
length message and produces a message digest, a footprint
Blockchain
User A
last block
Blockchain
User B
last block
Blockchain
UserC
last block
Fig. 2: Distributed blockchain.
of the message, that has fixed length, which is indicated in
figure as hash. The security of a hash algorithm is that the
function is not reversible (i.e. it cannot be traced back to
the original message knowing only this data) and it should
never be possible to intentionally create two different messages
with the same digest. The digest to the SHA256 includes the
blockID (for protecting from changes in the order of blocks), a
nonce, the timestamp, the transaction(s) and a copy of the hash
of the previous block. The nonce n is specifically mined so
that the resulting hash verifies specific conditions (e.g. it starts
with a given number of zeros). In case one or more blocks get
tampered, even in a single bit, the hash changes and the block
is not considered valid anymore. With high probability, indeed,
the condition on the hash is no more verified. A malicious
user could mine the new nonce in order to obtain a valid
block, however, its tampering is evident since the hash of such
block is not equal to the corresponding hash in the blockchain
owned by the majority of users. Besides, blocks are connected,
namely chained, so that the hash of block i-1 is included
as input to the SHA256 function to obtain the hash of the
subsequent i-th block. In this way, any tamper on a block
creates an invalid condition over all the following blocks in the
chain, as shown in Fig. 2, where invalid blocks are indicated
in gray, and the majority of users has a valid blockchain.
This chained setting has two effects: on one hand tampering
a past block requires to mine nonces for all successive blocks
(it is computationally unfeasible), on the other hand, the
validity of the whole chain can be checked by verifying only
the hash of the last block. The longer the blockchain is, the
more difficult the change of the content as an effect of the
computational burden for mining the nonces. A malicious
user with large computational power able to mine all nonces
would obtain a valid last block. However, even in such highly
improbable case, the last hash would not match the one
owned by the majority of the users, which are assumed as not
colliding. In this largely simplified description, anyone knows
about anyone elses transactions, exposing private data about
energy generation and consumption. However, blockchains
with confidential transactions have recently appeared [6] and
provide a solution to such privacy concerns. Further details
on the blockchain technology can be found in [7], while
[8] provides a comprehensive presentation of the required
cryptographic elements.
926
Figure 1. Blockchain model.
3.2. Attribute-Based Security
In attribute-based security, ciphertext is associated with some label of encry ors called attributes.
Each private key is also associate with th access tre known as predicate. The predicate defines
the policy how to decrypt the ciphertext with associated keys. Normally the predicate consists of
AND, OR and threshold gates [11]. Goyal [20] showed how users can associate and include predicates
into their private keys. It has two variants Key-Po icy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) and
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE). In KP-ABE, user’s secret keys are ge rat d
based on an predicate that defines the privileges scope of the concerned user, and data are encrypted
over a set of attributes. However, CP-ABE uses predicate to encrypt data and user’s s ret keys are
generated over a set of attributes. In CP-ABE, a user can decrypt the ciphertext if and only if his
attribute set satisfies the predicate.
Attribute-based security algorithms consist of mainly four steps: (1) algorithm setup, (2) private
key extraction, (3) signing and (4) verification. The universe of attributes is represented by S
while predicate over the universe of attributes is a monotone boolean function takes inputs from
U. We can say that an attribute set W satisfies a predicate β if β(µ) = 1 (where an input is valid if the
corresponding attributes are chosen from U).
4. Preliminaries
This section describes the notations used in this paper and some definitions as:
4.1. Bilinear Mapping
We consider two cyclic groups of prime order q i.e., (G,+) and (GT ,×). (G,+) is additive
cyclic group while (GT ,×) is multiplicative cyclic group. Bilinear mapping e : G × G → GT have
following properties:
1. Bilinearity: For any X, Y ∈ G and p, q ∈ Zy∗, it has e(pX, qY) = e(X, Y)pq
2. Non-degeneracy: For any X, Y ∈ G must satisfy e(X, Y) 6= 1GT
3. Computability: For any X, Y ∈ G it is easy to compute e(X, Y)
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4.2. Computations
We have a finite cyclic group G of order y and p, q, b, n ∈ Zy∗ are selected randomly. The security
of this approach lies in discrete logarithmic problem and computational bilinear diffie hellman problem.
These are defined as:
Discrete Logarithmic Problem: Given X, Y ∈ G, it is difficult to find the integer n such that Y = nX.
Computational Bilinear Diffie Hellman (CBDH) Problem: Given A = pX, B = qX, C = bX ∈ G and
bilinear mapping e : G× G → GT , it is difficult to find p, q, b if given e(X, X)pqb.
4.3. Predicate
Suppose we have a set of parties Xp = {Xp1 , Xp2 , Xp3 , ..., Xpn} and monotone access tree structure
β ∈ 2{Xp1 ,Xp2 ,Xp3 ,...,Xpn} such that for all I, E ∈ β and I ⊆ E. Also access structure β is a collection of
non empty subset of {Xp1 , Xp2 , Xp3 , ..., Xpn}.
Suppose we have a universe of attributes B and monotone access tree structure over this universe
is monotone Boolean function whose inputs are from B. There is another attributes set W ∈ S that
satisfies the predicate β if β(W) = 1. As β is a monotone in nature, for any set W ∈ V, β(W) = 1
implies β(V) = 1. In this paper, a microgrid is assigned a set of attributes and the authorized set is
also included in monotone access tree structure β. Data verifier (consumer) would be able to verify the
signature if and only if the attributes satisfy the access tree structure of the signature.
4.4. Multiple Authority Attribute-Based Signature
Multiple authority attribute-based signature scheme in microgrid architecture is split into
five steps.
1. Setup (1λ → Params): Security parameter (1λ) is given as input to generate public parameters.
2. Authority Setup (1λ → (Kk, lk)): Each authority (Ak) in the system generates a public key and a
private key using this algorithm. Where k = {1, 2, 3, ..., N} and N is the total number of authorities
in the system.
3. KeyGen (lk, GID, S) → (KU , lU): This algorithm generates the public and private key for
microgrid (KU , lU) by taking as input the private key of the authority (lk), global identifier
of the micrgrid (GID) and a set of attributes B.
4. Sign (Kk, lU , M, β) → e: To sign the message M using the access tree β, this algorithm takes as
input the public key of authority Kk, private key of microgrid lU and access policy β and generates
the signature e of the message M.
5. Verify (KU , e, B, M, β) → Accept/Reject: Upon receiving the signature and message, this
algorithm verifies the signature by taking inputs the public key of microgrid KU , received
signature e, message M, attributes set B, access policy β and generates output in the form
of Accept or Reject.
4.5. Security Definitions
Unforgeability is one of the main security feature that attribute-based signature scheme provides
however it also suffers from the colluding authorities or users. To explain it in a better way, we consider
a scenario between a challenger C and a forger F as follows.
Setup: During setup phase, the challenger C generates the public parameters using the using the
secret parameter 1λ and transmits it to F. F then sends the a predicate β∗ and list of malicious
users JA to C.
Authority/User Setup: In this phase, the challenger generates the public and private keys (KK, lK) for
the corrupted authorities and sends it to the forger F.
Queries: Now the challenger C initializes the integer m = 0 for the list J = {m, B, lU} and allows the
forger F to execute the following steps.
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Private key extraction oracle: Once the challenger C receives the m and set of attributes B,
it returns the secret key lU to the forger F otherwise it generates the lU using the KeyGen
algorithm and sends the generated lU to the forger and adds this new entry (m, B, lU) into
list J.
Signing oracle: As the challenger receives the message M and predicate β, its generates the
signature e and sends it back to the forger
Forgery: The forger F makes the tuple (M∗, e∗) and β∗ public.
A forger F wins the above scenario if and only if (1) it has a valid signature e∗ of the message M∗
with access policy β∗ and (2) β(S) 6= 1. The winning probability of this scenario by the forger is given
by AdvEUFMA−ABS(λ).
A forger can break the MA-ABS scheme (t, dH , dX, dB, e) if it executes the scenario at least
for t times and make dH hash queries, dX private key extraction queries, dB signing queries and
AdvEUFMA−ABS(λ) is at least e. The MA-ABS is unforgeable if there is no probabilistic polynomial time
forger exists that breaks (t, dH , dX , dB, e).
MA-ABS scheme is perfectly private if all the parameters, messages, attributes sets, all private
keys, predicates, distributed signature and actual signatures are equal. Also the signature should not
reveal any private information of the signer.
5. Multi-Authority ABS Scheme
The proposed microgrid system model for transactions and losses records is presented in this
section along with the ABS and blockchain.
5.1. System Model
The proposed ABS scheme is based on multiple authorities that is applicable to distributed
microgrid architecture with blockchain technology. The proposed model consists of the following
entities: (1) record server, (2) N authorities, (3) microgrids and (4) verifier (consumer). As shown in
Figure 2, record server behaves like a storage server that keeps the copy of all transactions happening
in the microgrid network. N authorities consists of various organizations (i.e., banks, consumer
registration authority, comsumers). Microgrids normally manage and sign their own transactions
records and create their own access policy. The verifier (consumer) accesses these information to ensure
their authenticity.
Publish Signature
Verify Signature
Record
Data
Send
Parameter
Verifier Microgrid
Servers
Figure 2. System model.
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5.2. Proposed Approach
For any m ∈ Zy, a set of attributes B whose elements also belongs to Zy, the Lagrange coefficient
is defined as
4m,B(v) = ∏
n∈B,j 6=m
v− n
m− n
The proposed scheme associates each element of Zy with each attribute. Detail description of the
proposed scheme is as follows:
Setup: During the setup phase, microgrid server chooses two cyclic groups G and GT of prime order
d and bilinear mapping function such that e : G × G → GT . Let X be a group generator of
G and H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗y is a collision resistant hash function based on ECDH. Computing
r = H(GID) for microgrid global identifier GID. N authorities in the system are represented by
A1, A2, A3, ..., AN and each authority has a set of attributes Ak = {ak,1, ak,2, ak,3, ..., ak,ck}. Also µ
is randomly selected from Z∗y and calculated Y as Y = µX. Now the overall public parameters
for this system are params = 〈e, d, X, Y, G, GT , H〉.
Authority Setup: Each authority randomly selects αk ∈ Z∗y and calculates yk = αkX. Also each
authority randomly selects yk ∈ Z∗a for each attribute pk,i ∈ Ak and calculates Tk,n = tk,mX.
Two authorities (Ak, An) select randomly skn ∈ Z∗y and share it with each other as a seed
for secret pseudorandom function (PRF) through a secure channel which then sets skn = snk.
These authority also selects vm, vn ∈ Z∗y to define a common PRF as
PRFkn(r) = (
vkvn
skn + r
)Y
The authority Ak outputs the public key as
Kk = 〈yk, {Tk,m}m∈{1,2,3,...,ck}〉
and private key as
lk = 〈αk, vk, {skn}n∈{1,2,3,..,ck}, {tk,m}m∈{1,2,3,...,ck}〉.
KeyGen: Each microgrid is assigned a set of attributes AU and each authority Ak picks ak ∈ Z∗y to
compute Bk,m =
ak
tk,m
for ak,m ∈ AkU where AkU = AU ∩ Ak. Each mircogrid U communicates
with each authority Ak for N − 1 times to finalize and computes the key anonymously as
Ikn = αkX + akY + PRFkn(r) for k > n
and
Ikn = αkX + akY− PRFkn(r) for k ≤ n
Finally
IU = ∑k,n∈{1,2,...,N}×{1,2,...,N} Ikn
= ∑k∈{1,2,...,N}(N − 1)αkX +∑k∈{1,2,...,N}(N − 1)akY
The public key is declared as
KU = 〈{Sk,nY}k∈{1,2,...,N},m∈{1,2,...,ck}〉
and the private key is declared as
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lU = 〈IU , {Bk,n}k∈{1,2,...,N},m∈{1,2,...,ck}〉
Sign: Every message is signed based on the access policy β. To do so, a polynomial dv is selected for
each leaf node/authority/party v. The degree of the polynomial is set as kv − 1, where kv is the
threshold value of v. Starting from R (i.e., root node), set dR(0) = s. Next another point on the
predicate is selected and terminate the polynomial at that point. The microgrid selects randomly
f ∈ Z∗y and calculates
e1 = sIU , e2 =
H(M) + f
N − 1 X, e3 = ∏k∈{1,2,..,N}
e(sX, yk),
e4 = vsX, e5 = sKU , e6 = f e5, e7 = {dv(0)Tk,m}pk,m∈Aβ
where pk,m is the value of attributes in access policy β. The final signature is
e = {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6, e7}
Verify: Each verifier (consumer) has a set of attributes denoted as AIV = {q1, q2, q3, ..., qt}.
If β(AIV) 6= 1 then the output is null. Otherwise, the verifier gets the signature e and performs
the operations on this signature using the public key of microgrid KU and node v from the access
policy β as inputs to verify function Veri f yNode(e, KU , v).
If pk,m ∈ AkU , then
Veri f yNode(e, KU , v) = ∏
k∈{1,2,..,N}
e(e7, KU)
= ∏
k∈{1,2,..,N}
e(dv(0)Tk,m,
ak
tk,m
Y)
= ∏
k∈{1,2,..,N}
e(dv(0)tk,mX,
ak
tk,m
Y)
= ∏
k∈{1,2,..,N}
e(X, Y)
dv(0)tk,m
ak
tk,m
= ∏
k∈{1,2,..,N}
e(X, Y)
dv(0) ∑
k∈{1,2,..,N}
ak
If pk,m /∈ AU then output of the Veri f yNode(e, KU , v) is null.
If node z is a child node of v, then Fz = Veri f yNode(e, KU , z) is calculated and kept the output
result. Suppose Bv is any arbitrary kv − sized set of child node z, makes the Fz 6= null. If there is
no such set, then Fz = null. Fx is calculated as shown below where B′v = {index(z) : z ∈ Bv} and
i = index(z),
Fv = ∏
z∈Bv
F
4i,B′v (0)
z
= ∏
z∈Bv
e(X, Y)dz(0)
(
∑
k∈{1,2,..,N}
ak
)
4i,B′v (0)
= ∏
z∈Bv
e(X, Y)dparent(z)(index(z))
(
∑
k∈{1,2,..,N}
ak
)
4i,B′v (0)
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= ∏
z∈Bv
e(X, Y)dv(i)
(
∑
k∈{1,2,..,N}
ak
)
4i,B′v (0)

= e(X, Y)
dv(0)
(
∑
k∈{1,2,..,N}
ak
)
For the access policy β(AkU) = 1, it is verified that
Veri f yNode(e, KU , v) = e(X, Y)
s
(
∑
k∈1,2,..,N
ak
)
.
The verifier (consumer) checks also
e(e1, e2) = e
H(M)
3 ∏
k∈1,2,..,N
(e(e4, yk)e(H(M)e5 + e6, Tk,m))
Once all the above conditions are successfully validated then verifier (consumer) Accepts
otherwise Rejects.
6. Performance and Evaluation
The security and performance analysis of the proposed protocol is performed using random
oracle model. First security analysis is performed followed performance analysis.
6.1. Security Analysis
To evaluate the security of proposed protocol, we consider two authorities Ak and An in our
system. These two authorities share secretly a PRF seed skn. This is important because if other N − 2
authorities get corrupted, the PRF seed share between these two authorities remains un-corrupted.
During the process of private key generation, all authorities private keys αm are combined into
mircogrid private key IU using the KeyGen function. This approach protects IU from disclosure even
if there is only one single honest authority and rest get compromised by an attacker. In this way the
protocol resists against collusion attack when there are N − 1 corrupted authorities. In order to protect
the privacy of microgrid, its GID is not revealed directly to authorities. Therefore corrupted authorities
cannot trace the private record of microgrid.
The proposed MA-ABS security model for microgrid is unforgeable for selective access policy
attacks using Computational Bilinear Diffie Hellman (CBDH). Suppose the forger F has some important
information e that can help the attacker using selective access policy attacks. In this case, the challenger
C selects the security parameter 1λ and runs the setup phase. The public parameters generated by
setup phase are sent to the forger. Using the simulator ς that takes the F, public parameters and e as
inputs to solve the CBDH.
To launch an attack, forger makes dX queries to extract the private keys, dH queries to hash
function and ds queries to signing oracle. Now the simulator ς is given 〈X, A = pX, B = qX, C = bX〉
to compute e(X, X)pqb where p, q, b ∈ Z∗q . The simulation is performed as:
• Setup: The forger F selects the challenger’s access policy β∗ and a set of attributes B∗. The forger
gives β∗ and B∗ along with the list of corrupted authorities JA to the simulator ς and sets
Y = (p + µ)X. The simulator returns A, B and C to the forger.
• Authority Setup: The simulator selects randomly A∗k ∈ {A1, A2, .., AN} \ JA. If Ak ∈ JA then
simulator selects fk, wk,m ∈ Z∗y randomly and calculates Tk,m = wk,mX for pk,m ∈ Ak. Then the
simulator selects vk ∈ Z∗y , a PRF seed sk,n ∈ Z∗y for corrupted authorities Ak and An and returns
the output 〈 fk, wk,m, vk, skn〉 and 〈yk, Tk,m〉 to the forger where yk = fkX.
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If Ak /∈ JA, then the simulator selects fk, wk,m ∈ Z∗y randomly and calculates Tk,m = wk,mX for
pk,m ∈ β∗ and Tk,m = wk,m A = wk,m pX for pk,m ∈ β∗. If AK 6= A∗K, the simulator sets yk = q fkX.
Otherwise it sets
yk = e(X, X)pq ∏
Ak∈JA
e(X, X)− fk ∏
Ak∈JA ,Ak 6=A∗k
e(X, X)−q fk .
Then the simulator randomly selects a PRF seed skn ∈ Z∗y for the honest authorities and returns
〈yk, Tk,m〉 to the forger.
• Query: Before starting the query process, simulator creates an empty list J and initialize an integer
m = 0. The forger then sends out the query as follow:
Hashing-Query: The simulator maintains a list of hashing query JH . This list contains the
output of the hashing function oracle for queries. When a query Mm is received, where
m = {1, 2, .., qH}, first simulator checks the queries record list JH . If the query already
exists in JH , the simulator outputs the entry of corresponding query. Otherwise it generates
H(Mm), adds it to the JH and returns as 〈Mm, H(Mm)〉.
Private Key Generation Query: Once the attributes set S with β(S) 6= 1 is received,
the simulator checks for the query 〈m, B, lU〉 in the record list J. If query exists, it returns lU
otherwise the simulator executes the following steps:
1. For any Ak ∈ JA the simulator generates the secret key using
〈 fk, wk,m, vk, skn〉
for the received set of attributes B.
2. If Ak /∈ JA, then the simulator randomly selects ak ∈ Z∗y and calculates {sk,m =
ak
wk,m
}pk,m∈β∗ and {sk,m =
ak
wk,m p
}pk,m∈β∗ . Now the simulator calculates Ikn as:
(a) If Ak 6= A∗k then for k > n,
Ik,m = fkqX + akY + PRFkn(U)
otherwise
Ik,m = fkqX + akY− PRFkn(U)
(b) If Ak = A∗k , then for k > n,
Ikn = − qµs X + ∑Ak∈JA
((− fk)X) +
∑
Ak /∈JA ,Ak 6=A∗k
((− fk)qX) + akY + PRFkn(U)
Otherwise
Ikn = − qµs X + ∑Ak∈JA
((− fk)X) +
∑
Ak /∈JA ,Ak 6=A∗k
((− fk)qX) + akY− PRFkn(U).
Finally, the simulator adds 〈m, B, lU〉 in J where lU = 〈IU , {Bk,m}〉 and also
returns it to the forger.
Signing Query: Once the signing query 〈M∗, β∗(B∗)〉 is received, the simulator checks if
|B ∩ B∗| < k then it generates the private key using the private key generation oracle.
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Otherwise, it simulates the signature on M with β∗(B) and calculates Y∗ = µ(bX) = bY and
signature output is as follows:
e∗1 = sIU , e
∗
2 =
(
H(M) + f
N − 1
)
bX
e∗3 = ∏
k∈{1,2,..,N}
s(s(bX), yk), e∗4 = f s(bX)
e∗5 = sK∗U , e∗6 = f e∗5 , e∗7 = {dv(0)Tk,m}pk,m∈Aβ∗
where
K∗U = sk,mY∗
Final signature returns by the simulator to forger is
e∗ = 〈e∗1 , e∗2 , e∗3 , e∗4 , e∗5 , e∗6 , e∗7〉
• Forgery: Once the forger generates the signature e∗ for the message M∗ with β∗(B∗),
he/she makes it available to public. If this signature is verified successfully then it
means that the forger successfully won the game. Let tS and tB denote the time that is
consumed during the scalar multiplication over the elliptic curve group and bilinear pairing
respectively. If attacker successfully breaks this algorithm (MA-ABS) in time t, then it
is easy to calculate the time t′ taken by the new algorithm to solve CBDH problem as
t′ ≈ t + qH(tS + tB) + dX(3 + 2N)N(N − 1)tS + dS(6ts + NtB).
• Privacy: To ensure and protect the privacy of the signer that has a set of attributes B for access
policy β, a valid signature is created using another set of attributes B′ that satisfies the same access
policy β. Signature will not disclose the subset of attributes used to sign the message. This is
because, any subset of k elements from a given set of attributes is used to sign the message and
produce a valid signature. To ensure the privacy of signer, first the challenger runs the Setup and
Authority Setup steps to generate the public parameters, public key Kk and the private key lk of
the authority for forger. The forger then outputs 〈β, B0, B1, M∗〉 after querying the private key
oracle and signing oracle where B0 ⊇ B and B1 ⊇ B. Forger also request to challenger to endorse
the message M∗ with respect to β using B0 or B1. The challenger now generates a challenge
signature. As B0 ∩ B = B and B1 ∩ B = B, the challenger selects randomly a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and
outputs a signature e∗ with the private key lBb over the set of attribute BB. Using the Lagrange
interpolation, it is observed that e∗ can be generated using lBb or lB1−b . Hence the forger is not
able to steal the signer attributes.
6.2. Performance Analysis
In this section, the performance of the proposed algorithm is compared with the existing
attribute-based signature approaches. To calculate the time consumption, we consider bilinear pairing
operation, scalar multiplication operation, and exponentiation operation without considering the hash
functions. TX , TS and Te are the time consumed by these operations respectively. The results in Table 1
shows the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in distributed environment with multiple authorities.
The computational const in SignVerify operation increases linear with the number of authorities and
attributes. More specifically, the computational cost in sign operation is (6 + t)TS + NTX while the
computational cost of the verify operation is TS + Te + (2tN + 1)TX . The size of the signature depends
on the number of attributes and defines the cost of communication overhead. The signature size in
proposed algorithm is (6 + t)|G|.
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Table 1. Comparison of attribute-based signature schemes.
Properties [5] [16] [18] [19] [ours]
Cost of signing (lt + t + 3)Te (7l + 15)Te (6 + 2l + lt)Te (l + t + 16)Te + 3Tp (6 + t)Ts + NTp
Cost of Verifying (2lt + 1)Te + (l +
2+ (t− 1)(l + 1))Tp
(l + 1)Te + (L +
2)Tp
(l + 2)Te +
(l + 4)Tp
(2lt + t + 12)Te + (l +
7 + (t− 1)(l + 1))Tp
Ts + Te +
(2tN + 1)Tp
Size of signature (l + t + 2)|G| (7l + 11)|G| (l + t + 2)|G| (l + t + 11)|G| (6 + t)|G|
Predicates Monotone Non-Monotone Monotone Monotone Monotone
Multi Authority Extensible Extensible No No Yes
Security Model Generic Group Standard Standard Generic Group Random
Security Assumption CR Hash DLIN/CR Hash CDH CR Hash CBDH
Privacy Perfect Perfect Perfect Imperfect Perfect
Resisting Collusion Attack No No No No Yes
Note: l shows the number of attributes, t shows the user attributes, CR Hash is Collision Resistance
hash function, DLIN is decisional linear problem and CDH is Computational Diffie–Hellman.
7. Conclusions
To protect the privacy of microgrid transactions and losses using blockchain technology,
the multiple authority attribute-based signature approach is introduced, which satisfies and meets the
distributed requirement of microgrid as well as ensure the anonymity of information. The authorities
agree on PRF seed and generates the private key for microgrid. If N− 1 authorities collude, they cannot
reveal the private key of microgrid. The security proof of the proposed protocol is discussed using
CBDH assumption of unforgeability and privacy. Finally, the comparative analysis showed the
effectiveness of the proposed protocol.
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